Furthermore, methodological individualism implies no commitment to any specific type of intentional state that is assumed to motivate individuals to act as they do. In its barest form, as represented by Homans' form of behavioristic methodological individualism (e.g., Homans 1987) , it may not make any reference to mental or intentional states whatsoever. Most methodological individualists are not behaviorists, however; they focus on actions, i.e., behavior guided by intentions.
Since methodological individualism so often is associated with "economic imperialism" and rational-choice theory, it is important to emphasize, once again, that the doctrine implies no commitment to any specific type of intentional state, and it does not deny the obvious fact that intentional states have important social dimensions. Hence methodological individualism is not rational-choice theory in disguise, and it does not imply a view of the social world as being composed of atomistic individuals. (For a discussion of the difference between atomism and individualism, see Pettit 1993.) Our preferred definition of the term is a slightly elaborated version of a definition once proposed by Jon Elster (1983) :
Methodological individualism is a doctrine according to which all social phenomena, their structure and change, are in principle explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another.
Methodological individualism is not only a positive statement about what in principle
can be done, however; it also is a normative methodological statement about what ought to be done whenever possible, and we will return to this point later.
Whether this type of doctrine should be labeled methodological individualism, sociological individualism, or structural individualism is of lesser importance to us.
What is important is what it represents; and it represents a quest for causal depth in explanations. This causal depth is arrived at by making explicit the micro foundations, or the social cogs and wheels through which the macro outcomes to be explained are brought about. In this view, actions 1 are important because nearly everything that interests us as sociologists are the intended or unintended outcomes of individuals' actions, and relations are important because relations to others are central when it comes to explaining the content of individuals' intentional states as well as their action opportunities, and both of these are important for explaining why individuals do what they do. In addition, relations are central for explaining why, acting as they do, individuals bring about the social outcomes they do.
That relations are important for explaining outcomes does not mean that they are independent of individuals and their actions, however. As emphasized above, in principle, all relational structures can be understood in terms of intended or unintended outcomes of individuals' actions and intentional attitudes. This form of methodological individualism is perfectly compatible with an explanatory strategy that takes certain "structures" as exogenously given.
We are not arguing for hypothetical "rock-bottom explanations" (Watkins 1957 ) that start from an idealized state of nature in which no social relations are assumed to exist or to matter. Such thought experiments can be challenging and entertaining and they can be of use in normatively-oriented theory, but we do not see them as serious contenders for explanations of what is observed here and now. Many essential components of sociological explanations --such as norms and networks -often are the results of long and intricate social processes. If we were to aim for "rock bottom" explanations, these sorts of components must either be ignored, which to us seem unacceptable; or they must be endogenized, which given the current state of social theory, in many cases is impossible. For this reason, the realism and the precision of the proposed explanation is greatly improved if we take certain macro-level properties as given and incorporate them into the explanation.
It is important to recognize that in contrast to some traditional forms of individualism, the sociological individualism we are advocating does not attempt to eliminate macro social phenomena from ontology or to reduce them to individual properties. In our view macro social phenomena are of central explanatory concern in sociology. The crucial issue is how to explain them. In order to get a better grasp of this, we need a clear idea of what kinds of things they are.
Macro-social properties
What are macro properties in the case of sociology? In our view, macro properties are properties of a collectivity or a set of micro level entities that are not definable for a single micro-level entity. In other words, macro properties are attributes of things like societies, communities, organizations and groups that are not meaningfully attributed to individuals. Quite often sociologists talk about macro properties in terms of structures, for example, when they talk about age structure or occupational structure. However, macro properties do not constitute a unified kind.
For this reason, it is meaningful to characterize them with a sample of examples rather than a general definition (Hedström 2005) .
1) When sociologists are studying changes in racial prejudices over time, comparing communities with respect to their level of conformism, or trying to characterize organizational cultures, they are basically interested in typical behaviors, beliefs and attitudes of the members of these communities.
2) When sociologists are studying ethnical segregation of cities, comparing societies in terms of inequality, or describing the social stratification of a society, they are addressing distributions of individuals and their various attributes.
3) When sociologists are studying the spread of information within an organization, comparing groups with respect to their level of network clustering, or characterizing brokering opportunities of an individual occupying a structural whole, they are focusing on topologies of networks.
This list of examples is not exhaustive, but it shows that macro social properties are a central descriptive and explanatory concern for sociology. In all these cases, the object of explanation is a social phenomenon that is an attribute of a collectivity of actors. Influential sociological analyses that exemplify this focus on social phenomena include Durkheim's (1897) analysis of suicide rates, Weber's (1904) analysis of why modern capitalism emerged in the Western world, and Coleman, Katz, and Menzel's (1957) analysis of the diffusion of a new drug. In all of these analyses the entities to be explained were social or macro-level phenomena characterizing the properties of a collectivity or a group of individuals and these properties are not definable for a single individual.
One way to characterize the relation between micro and macro is to employ the philosophical concept of supervenience (Horgan 1993 , Kim 1993 Hedström & Bearman 2009 ). Briefly, a macro property, M, is said to supervene on a set of micro level properties, P, if identity in P necessarily implies identity in M (see Figure 1 ). If macro is supervenient upon the micro it means that, if two collectivities or societies are identical to one another in terms of their micro-level properties, then their macro level properties also will be identical. It also implies that two collectivities that differ in their macro level properties will necessarily differ in their micro level properties as well. As the slogan goes, there is no difference in macro properties without a difference in micro properties. However, the relation of supervenience does not imply that two collectivities with identical macro level properties will necessarily have identical micro level properties because identical macro-level properties can be "realized" in different ways. Let us take two simple examples to illustrate the point of multiple realizability. First, the divorce rate of a society (a macro-level property) can be exactly the same at two points in time although it is not the same individuals who are married and divorced at the two points in time. Second, a social network describing the links that exist between a group of individuals can have identical macro-level properties (density, centrality, degree distribution, etc) at different points in time although the micro-level details of the network, who is linked to whom, may have changed considerably. The notion of supervenience has been used much in philosophy of mind to characterize the relation between the mental and the physical (Horgan 1993 , Kim 1993 From our point of view, the layered picture of the social world inspired by philosophy of mind has very little to give for the social sciences. Even if it were possible to characterize the unique contrasts between individual and social levels, this would have very little methodological relevance. In contrast, the micro-macro distinction is important in all sciences. We suggest that the notion of supervenience is used only in the modest role of characterizing particular micro and macro relations. The difference between the two is a difference of scale that is analogical to part-whole relationship.
Whereas the contrast between 'individual' and 'social' levels is categorical, micro- illustrate, many details of this causal story are missing and it is still open issue how important these factors actually were. Whatever is the final verdict on these issues, from our point of view it is notable that Weber's work illustrates the mechanistic explanatory strategy we are advocating.
As noted above, the idea of mechanistic explanation does not imply that we have to always regress to some specific and privileged 'individual level' in our explanations.
Rather, it demands that we make sense of the macro pattern in terms of some wellunderstood micro mechanisms. The properties and processes included in these micro mechanisms can then themselves be turned into objects of mechanistic explanations.
Just like in other sciences, mechanistic explanation in social sciences is based on chains of mechanistic levels, not some privileged level of explanation.
From an explanatory point of view, explicating the links between micro and macro and how they evolve over time, are fundamental because macro level regularities say so little about why we observe what we observe. The knowledge of underlying causal mechanisms improves our understanding of a social phenomenon in a number of a different ways (Ylikoski 2010) . First, it helps us to understand why the macro level regularity holds (or why there are no macro level regularities) and what are its background conditions. Second, it connects the causal claim with other pieces causal knowledge and thus integrates our knowledge of the phenomenon. Third, it helps us to understand under which conditions the macro level generalization breaks apart.
Computer simulation and sociological explanations
Until very recently we did not have the analytical tools needed for analyzing the dynamics of complex systems that large groups of interacting individuals represent.
But powerful computers and simulation software has changed the picture. So-called agent-based computer simulation has a promise of transforming important parts of sociological theory because they allow for rigorous theoretical analyses of large complex systems (see Macy and Willer 2002; Epstein 2006) . The basic idea behind such analyses is to identify the core mechanisms believed to be at work, assemble them into a simulation model, and run the simulation to establish the macro-level outcomes expected given the micro-level assumptions of the model.
The most famous example of agent-based simulation in the social sciences is Thomas Schelling's (1971) segregation model. As it has been used as an example so many times before, we will illustrate the principles involved in these types of analyses with a study of self-enforcing norms by Damon Centola, Robb Willer and Michael Macy It is easy to see why people would pressure others to behave the way they want them to behave. However, the tricky question is why would people publicly enforce a norm that they secretly wish would go away? Centola et al. suggest that in these cases the people who really want to enforce the norm, can trigger enforcement cascades which result in others enforcing norms that they do not privately support. For true believers, it is not sufficient that others do the right thing; they must do it for the right reason.
This creates a problem for those who are not committed to the norm but want to avoid sanctions from the true believers: they must somehow prove their sincerity in order to avoid being exposed as posers. One way to demonstrate sincerity is to sanction those who voice opposition to the norm. The enforcement of the norm serves as a signal of a genuine conviction.
The above reasoning shows that cascades of self-enforcing norms are possible, but it tells us very little about the circumstances under which they are likely to emerge. Can self-enforcing norms emerge in a reluctant population without top-down institutional repression or without special circumstances that jump-start the process? Can the process be entirely self-organizing? How many true believers are needed and how weak-willed must the disbelievers be for a cascade to start unfolding? Verbal theorizing cannot answer these questions and it is very difficult to study these kinds of processes purely empirically. Centola et. al. show how agent-based computer simulations can be used for getting leverage on dynamics that would otherwise be intractable.
In the simulations, the population consists of agents who differ in their beliefs and convictions. A small group of true believers is assumed to have such strong convictions that they always comply with the norm. When dissatisfied with the level of compliance by others, they may enforce the norm. The remainder of the population consists of disbelievers who privately oppose the norm, but with less conviction compared to that of the true believers. The disbelievers may deviate from the norm or even pressure others to deviate as well. However, the disbelievers can also be pressured to support the norm and even to enforce it. At every iteration of the simulation, each agent observes how many of its neighbors comply with the norm and how many deviate. They also observe how many neighbors are enforcing the compliance and how many are enforcing deviations from the norm. Based on this information, the agents decide whether they comply or deviate and whether they enforce others to behave similarly in the next round.
In their simulations Centola et. al. manipulated three kinds of conditions: 1) the access to information about the behavior of other agents; 2) the frequency distribution and clustering of true believers; and 3) the network topology. The results of these simulations were surprising: the cascades are much easier to achieve than expected. A The process of building a formal model forces the theorist to make explicit her reasoning and makes it possible to see what follows from given assumptions.
Similarly, the model-building allows for the same type of piecemeal theoretical development that has been useful in other sciences. Sociologists should regard the method of isolation and abstraction (Mäki 1992) as an indispensable part of theorydevelopment: empirical reality is complex and it is futile to try to capture it in all its complexity. However, it should be kept in mind that simplicity and elegance are only instrumental values and should not override the aim of accurately describing the real causal mechanisms producing the observable phenomena. Rather than seeking excessively precise fictions, social scientists should aim for theoretical assumptions known to be at least roughly correct. As Tukey (1962: 15-16) once put it, 'far better an approximate solution to the right question than …an exact answer to the wrong question'.
Conclusions
In this paper we have been advocating a form of sociological individualism that is substantially different from many traditional forms of methodological individualism, but still has a methodological bite. It emphasizes the importance of asking causal questions and thinking in terms of mechanisms. The mechanistic approach to explanation does not attempt to eliminate macro social factors from sociological explanations, nor does it attempt to reduce them. It rather bridges macro facts to micro facts by means of mechanistic explication of causal processes.
The central message of this approach is the following: in order to understand macro and micro dynamics, we must study the collectivity as a whole, but we must not study it as a collective entity. Only by taking into account the individual entities, their properties, relations, and activities, can we understand the collective dynamics.
Without tools like agent-based simulations it would be impossible to predict and explain the dynamics. Since tools like these are becoming increasingly more available and easy to use, the future of sociology as a rigorous scientific discipline looks to us brighter than it has ever done before.
